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Good and Bad Reasons to Reject Externalism 
Abstract 
The debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology concerns one of the traditional conditions for 
knowledge: justification. Specifically, proponents of these theories seek to understand precisely what confers 
justification on a belief. Theories of justification are typically characterized as internalist if they hold that all justifiers 
are cognitively accessible to a person. Externalism represents the rejection of this thesis; defenders of this theory deny 
that the justifiers must be internal to a believer’s perspective. This paper presents an objection to the externalist 
account. Externalism, broadly construed, allows a person to be justified when they hold beliefs for the wrong reasons, 
and this indicates a significant problem with the theory. This paper argues that this kind of objection will not work for 
at least one significant variation of the externalist thesis: reliabilism. Finally, the idea that this theory must still account 
for a “good reasons” evaluation of justification, an internalist consideration, is proposed and promoted. 
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Good and Bad Reasons to Reject Externalism 
I: Introduction 
The debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology concerns one of the 
traditional conditions for knowledge. Specifically, proponents of these theories seek to understand 
what confers justification on a belief.1 In other words, what makes one’s belief a good one to hold? 
A belief is justified if most of the relevant factors support its truth. However, a belief’s being true 
does not render it justified, and a belief can be justified without being true. One’s current evidence 
might compel them to justifiably hold a certain belief, while later, stronger evidence proves that 
the belief was false. As long as a belief is supported by one’s current epistemic situation, 
justification is achieved. The relevant parts of one’s current epistemic situation to a belief are 
called justifiers. Justifiers are our bases for believing a proposition, the reasons why we hold a 
given belief. Reasons that warrant justification must be good reasons. Good reasons, like sensory 
experience, evidence, and other justified beliefs, render a belief likely to be true.2 A justified belief 
will usually come with a strong reason to hold it, and there is typically little reason to hold an 
unjustified belief. Philosophers have been divided on what counts as a good justifier.3 This paper 
will be relatively silent on the various perspectives on what constitutes a justifier. Rather, the 
interest of this paper is whether or not these justifiers must be readily available to a believer.  
Much work in epistemology has shown that a justified believer may not always be able to 
say why their belief is justified. Must there always be an answer to the question why do you believe 
 
1 It is worth noting that the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology is not confined only to 
justification. This distinction figures prominently in moral philosophy, the philosophy of mind, and semantics. The 
scope of this paper, however, is limited to internalism and externalism about justification. 
2 It is also easy to conjure up bad reasons—one could attempt to justify their beliefs on the basis of rash emotions, 
prejudice, or hearsay, for example. 
3 For instance, evidentialists think a belief is justified so long as it is formed on the basis of good evidence. Many also 
argue that other beliefs we hold can legitimately serve as justifiers. 
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that? Internalists think there must be.4 Theories of justification are typically characterized as 
internalist if they hold that all justifiers are cognitively accessible to a person. One knows why 
their beliefs are justified. All justificatory reasons either are or can be internal to the believer’s 
perspective, available upon reflection. As Alvin Plantinga writes, “the basic thrust of internalism 
in epistemology…is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which 
the believer has some special sort of epistemic access.”5 William Alston portrays the internalist 
position as a constraint; it “will restrict justifiers to items that are within something, more 
specifically, within the subject.”6 
Externalism represents the rejection of this thesis. Defenders of externalism deny that the 
justifiers must be cognitively accessible. This paper presents an objection to the externalist 
account. Sections II and III will show that externalism, broadly construed, allows a person to be 
justified when they hold beliefs for the wrong reasons, and this indicates a significant problem 
with the theory. These sections will also serve as a jumping-off point for a more sustained critique 
of reliabilism, a specific and popular articulation of the externalist thesis, in Sections IV and V. 
Finally, Section VI will argue that reliabilism must still account for a “good reasons” evaluation 
of justification. 
II: Motivating Externalism 
Externalists hold that factors outside of the believer can serve as justifiers.7 It is not 
necessary for a believer to have an internal or cognitive grasp of the reasons that make her belief 
 
4 Some prominent internalists are Laurence BonJour, Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, and Roderick Chisholm. It is 
worth noting that there are at least two broad categories of internalism: mentalism and access internalism. This paper 
will not dwell on this distinction, as its focus is not to defend internalism, but reject externalism. 
5 Plantinga, Justification, Internalism, and Deontology, 6. 
6 Alston, Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, 179. 
7 Leading externalists are Alvin Goldman, D. M. Armstrong, Robert Nozick, and Alvin Plantinga. Not all versions of 
internalism and externalism are totally pure; some have also defended hybrid models. 
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justified. As John Greco puts it, “the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely determined by 
factors that are internal to the believer’s perspective.”8 In broad strokes, externalism seems 
intuitively suspect. How could one be justified in a belief if they do not know what it is that makes 
their belief justified? Yet, interestingly, the results of a 2009 PhilPapers Survey, which gathered 
information on the views accepted by professional philosophers on a number of important issues, 
reveals that 43% of respondents are externalists about justification, nearly double the support of 
the opposite camp.9 
A number of arguments can be made in support of the externalist view and serve to make 
the theory more plausible. Perhaps the most compelling argument for externalism focuses on what 
seems intuitively to be a close connection between truth and justification. According to the 
externalist, for a belief to be justified means that it is objectively likely to be true. Yet, the objective 
truth-conduciveness of a belief – the likelihood that it will turn out to be true – is not in any way 
determined by a believer’s mental or internally accessible states. Instead, 
[the] objective likelihood of a belief given a body of evidence is a matter of the strength of 
 correlation in the actual world between the truth of the belief and the body of 
 evidence. If one applies some liquid to a litmus paper and it turns red then the objective 
 likelihood that the liquid is acidic is very high. But the strong correlation between red 
 litmus paper and acidity is not reflectively accessible.10 
Thus, if justification is as closely related to truth as the externalist suggests it is, not all justificatory 
reasons can be said to be internal to the believer. 
 Another appeal of the externalist account connects to the well-foundedness of a belief. We 
 
8 Greco, Justification Is Not Internal, 325. 
9 Chalmers, Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?, 8. More specifically, 43% of respondents identified 
themselves as externalists or leaned toward externalism, 26% favoured internalism, and remaining respondents were 
either unfamiliar with the issue, selected another option, or believe there is no answer. 
10 Poston, Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. 
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can distinguish between having good, accessible reasons to believe something and basing one’s 
belief on those reasons. Comesaña defines well-foundedness in the following way: “the intuitive 
idea is that for a belief to be well-founded it has to not only fit the subject's evidence, but also be 
based on that evidence.”11 A belief is well-founded in that it is caused by good reasons. Well-
foundedness could represent a problem for internalists since causal relations are not always 
cognitively accessible. Externalism, meanwhile, does not have to contend with this issue since its 
central thesis is that not every factor determining justification is internal. A good theory of 
justification must account for this causal relation, and it squares better with an externalist account. 
III: Believing for the Wrong Reasons: Careful and Hasty 
This section will formulate what seems to be a significant problem for the externalist 
account of justification and will borrow from Richard Feldman’s ‘Thievery’ example, which 
illustrates the appeal of the evidentialist view. Feldman’s example describes a stolen painting and 
three characters: officers Careful and Hasty, and thief Filcher. He conveys the proceedings thus: 
 Someone has broken into Art’s house and stolen a valuable painting. Officer Careful 
 investigates the case and comes up with conclusive evidence that Filcher committed the 
 crime. Careful finds the painting in Filcher’s possession, finds Filcher’s fingerprints at the 
 scene of the crime, and so on. Careful comes to believe: 
1. Filcher stole the painting. 
Meanwhile, Hasty also hears about the theft. Hasty happens to live next door to Filcher and 
 has had some unpleasant dealings with him. Hasty dislikes Filcher intensely and blames 
 him for many bad things that happen. Hasty has some vague idea that Filcher works in the 
 art business but has no specific knowledge about what he does. With nothing more to go 
 on, Hasty also believes (1).12 
The point of this example is to highlight the difference between a justified and an unjustified belief. 
Why is it the case that Careful is justified in believing (1), and Hasty is not? Careful believes 
 
11 Comesaña, A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, 32-33. Well-foundedness here is tailored to the 
evidentialist account. 
12 Feldman, Evidentialist Theories of Knowledge and Justification, 39. 
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Filcher is the thief on the basis of his evidence supporting that conclusion. In other words, Careful’s 
belief is justified because he holds it for good reasons, namely his evidence. Conversely, it is 
intuitively implausible to think that Hasty has good reasons for believing (1). Hasty’s only grounds 
for believing Filcher stole the painting is his dislike for the man. This cannot constitute a good 
reason. So, our intuitions tell us that Hasty should not hold (1) since his belief in (1) is unjustified. 
We see here that it is possible to believe on the basis of bad reasons, and that doing so cannot 
confer justificatory status on a belief. 
 This example can serve as an objection to the externalist theory of justification. This is 
because the externalist would have to hold that Hasty’s belief is, in fact, justified. If this is the case, 
it indicates something deeply problematic with the externalist thesis. But why must the externalist 
uphold this conclusion? The externalist would naturally agree that Hasty’s belief is not justified 
by his dislike for Filcher; yet, he can still be justified if there are external factors that are 
justification-conferring. As the ‘Thievery’ example indicates, these justificatory reasons do indeed 
exist. They are to be found in the large body of evidence on which Careful has based his belief. 
The very facts that Filcher’s fingerprints are at the scene of the crime and Filcher is in possession 
of the missing painting make Hasty’s belief justified for the externalist. These are justification-
conferring reasons in that they render (1) objectively likely to be true, and the fact that they are not 
internally accessible to Hasty at the time of his belief-formation does not change that he is justified. 
This is the externalist picture: that one can be justified in a belief not formed on the basis of 
justificatory reasons, as long as those reasons exist. So, the externalist allows for a believer to be 
justified when they hold a belief for the wrong reasons. 
Thus far, this paper has appealed mostly to intuition to suggest that Hasty is unjustified for 
believing on the basis of bad reasons. A more concrete articulation of why we ought to come to 
5
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this verdict can also be provided. It is likely that Hasty would believe (1) in any world that 
maintained his dislike for Filcher, since, in our world, he does not hold it for any reason outside of 
this dislike. So, we can imagine a world B in which the painting is still missing, yet there is no 
such evidence against Filcher. In this world, too, Hasty would likely believe that Filcher stole the 
painting on the basis of his emotions. Of course, no reasonable theory would hold that Hasty is 
justified in his belief in this world. The reasoning behind this conviction, however, is that Hasty 
holds this belief for the wrong reasons. He has no good reason for believing Filcher stole the 
painting. Moreover, these good reasons do not exist as external factors. In world B, Hasty believes 
in (1) for bad reasons, and this belief is neither true nor justified. 
The point here is that, if we can blame Hasty in world B for believing for the wrong reasons, 
then that same problem should hold in our world. Hasty believes that Filcher stole the painting 
because he dislikes him, and he would hold this belief even if it were not true. Hasty’s bad 
reasoning coupled with the fact that his belief does not have to be true for him to hold it should 
render Hasty unjustified and epistemically blameworthy. Yet, for the externalist, he is not. Thus, 
the externalist account of justification allows someone to both a) believe something for bad reasons 
and b) be justified in that belief. This position is both unintuitive, since justification seems to have 
some essential connection to believing for good reasons, and epistemically blameworthy, given 
the plausibility of the world B example. If this is the case, the externalist position must either be 
resolved or rejected. 
IV: Narrowing the Scope: A Response from Reliabilism 
As shown above, externalism in its most general form appears to face a major problem. 
The theory allows for poorly-reasoned beliefs to be justified, even though our intuition tells us 
they are unjustified.  However, many would be quick to point out that no reasonable person would 
6




hold this view. There are externalist theories, and externalism has many different iterations. While 
what was discussed above reveals a potential issue with the general sentiment of externalism, this 
paper has not shown that more well-defined or narrow versions of the externalist theory are also 
subject to the objection raised: that externalism allows beliefs formed on the basis of bad reasons. 
More clearly defined forms of externalism must therefore be addressed. Specific versions of the 
core thesis include the causal theory of knowledge and truth-tracking.13 But by far the most widely-
held version of the externalist thesis is reliabilism. This is the version of externalism taken up in 
the remainder of this paper. Reliabilism is a version of externalism that is not readily undermined 
by this objection and not immediately subject to the claim that externalist theories of justification 
allow for justified beliefs formed on the basis of bad reasons. 
 Reliabilism is an externalist theory of justification, formulated concretely by Alvin 
Goldman, a leading epistemologist. His objective is to conceive of a theory of justification that 
does not use epistemic terms to define a justified belief because defining justification through other 
epistemic terms results in a non-substantive explanation. Goldman is thus committed to the 
constraint of reductivism, meaning that he cannot “invoke any unanalyzed epistemic terms such 
as ‘justification,’ ‘rationality,’ or ‘evidence.’”14 Goldman states that what causes us to view a belief 
as unjustified is the faultiness of the process by which it was formed. Because of this, it follows, 
according to Goldman, that good principles of justification will have causal requirements, and 
“conditions that fail to require appropriate causes of a belief don’t guarantee justifiedness.”1516 
 
13 The former thesis, led by Alvin Goldman and D. M. Armstrong, says that S has knowledge if S’s belief that p is 
caused by the fact that makes p true. Robert Nozick’s notion of truth-tracking tells us that S has knowledge if S tends 
to believe p when it is true and not believe p when it is false. Like reliabilism, each of these theories is externalist. 
Addressing these forms of externalism is outside of the scope of this paper. One reason for this is that each of these 
theories is expressed in terms of knowledge more generally, rather than justification specifically. 
14 Emelia Miller, Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat, 83. 
15 Goldman, What is Justified Belief?, 338. 
16 Reliabilism shares this appeal to causation with other defenses of externalism. 
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Now, we must figure out which kinds of causes generally confer justification. By reviewing faulty 
processes of belief-formation – whose outputs would be considered unjustified – Goldman deduces 
that each shares the feature of unreliability. These would include such processes as hunches, 
guesswork, and wishful thinking. Unreliable here means that these processes typically result in 
error, or do not lead to true beliefs. Conversely, the belief-forming processes we generally take as 
justification-conferring – such as introspection or memory – share reliability as a feature. 
Reliability can be understood as the tendency to yield from a process true, rather than false, beliefs. 
From this line of reasoning, Goldman produces the reliabilist principle of justification: “[i]f S’s 
believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then 
S’s belief in p at t is justified.”17 Thus, for Goldman, a well-formed belief is a justified one, and, 
as a theory of doxastic justification, it incorporates the idea of well-foundedness into the notion of 
justification.1819 
 This picture of reliabilism clearly differentiates itself from the general theory of 
externalism, because reliabilism has different requirements for justification. Reliabilism is a 
variety of externalism because the justifier – being reliably-caused – is not something internal or 
apparently accessible to the believer. This is because being reliably-caused is a matter of a belief 
being formed through a process that is truth-conducive. Truth-conduciveness is not something 
readily accessible or internal to a believer. As Laurence BonJour puts it, for reliabilists the 
 …main requirement for justification is roughly that the belief be produced in a way or via a 
 process that makes it objectively likely that the belief is true. What makes such a view 
 externalist is the absence of any requirement that the person for whom the belief is justified 
 have any sort of cognitive access to the relation of reliability in question. Lacking such 
 access, such a person will in general have no reason for thinking that the belief is true or 
 likely to be true, but will, on such an account, none the less be epistemically justified in 
 
17 Goldman What is Justified Belief?, 340. 
18 Comesaña, A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, 31. 
19 Doxastic here means justification pertaining to belief, as opposed to justification about action, for instance. 
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 accepting it.20 
Justification is a matter of, or can involve, external factors for the reliabilist. For example, perhaps 
one thinks they have bad eyesight; in reality, their vision is fine and can reliably lead them to form 
true beliefs. The reliability of one’s belief-forming process is therefore external to their 
perspective. Thus, reliabilism represents a version of externalism with stricter and more detailed 
requirements. 
 It may now begin to be clear why this objection does not yet work against reliabilism. As 
has been established above, in the ‘Thievery’ example, Hasty’s belief in (1) is unjustified. The 
general externalist position must uphold the position that Hasty is, in fact, justified, which indicates 
a significant problem with the theory. Reliabilism, however, escapes this conclusion. This is 
because the external factor which confers justification is a matter of using a reliable belief-forming 
process. Hasty does not use such a process in the forming of his belief in (1). Instead, Hasty 
employs what Goldman would likely consider an unreliable belief-forming process, rendering his 
belief unjustified. Hasty’s belief is caused by his emotional attitude toward Filcher, namely, his 
dislike. Of course, forming beliefs on the basis of hatred cannot reliably produce true beliefs. So, 
the reliabilist must dismiss Hasty’s belief as unjustified. Because of this, it appears that the initial 
formulation of the objection can only work against generalized, loosely-defined externalism. 
V: Reformulating the Objection 
Perhaps this type of objection can be reformulated in such a way that undermines the 
reliabilist position and determines whether or not they too must allow beliefs adopted for the wrong 
reasons to be justified. Consider the following example: 
Magic 8-Ball: Susie has some condition that makes it very difficult for her to form beliefs 
 
20 BonJour, Recent Work on the Internalism-Externalism Controversy, 365. 
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or make decisions all on her own. So she chooses not to exhaust her mental labour on 
normal, everyday beliefs. Luckily, she has a Magic 8-Ball to help her in her belief-forming 
processes. Moreover, this Magic 8-ball typically produces the right results. Susie asks, 
“Will my home team win tomorrow?” Her Magic 8-Ball answers, “Yes,” and, sure enough, 
they do. If Susie asks whether 2 + 2 = 5, the ball usually gives the correct answer. Because 
of this tendency, Susie forms many of her beliefs using the Magic 8-Ball. 
This example hinges on the intuition that Susie is unjustified in her beliefs formed through the 
Magic 8-Ball. Despite being short on alternatives due to her condition, by basing her beliefs on 
what the Magic 8-Ball tells her, Susie believes for the wrong reasons. Trusting a response-
producing plastic toy cannot constitute believing for good reasons. Perhaps this is because there is 
no apparent necessary connection between the beliefs produced by the Magic 8-Ball and the truth 
of those beliefs. We could chalk it up to a matter of luck, so Susie appears to be unjustified in her 
beliefs formed on the basis of the Magic 8-Ball. 
 It is possible that this example would not persuade a reliabilist. Perhaps they would concede 
that Susie’s belief is justified because the Magic 8-Ball does, after all, yield generally true, reliably-
caused beliefs. As shown above, reliability is a test of truth-conduciveness, and a process is reliable 
if it tends to yield true beliefs rather than false beliefs. This is the case with Susie’s Magic 8-Ball; 
its answers typically allow Susie to form true rather than false beliefs. The Magic 8-Ball is thus a 
reliable belief-forming mechanism. Because she forms her beliefs using this process, Susie’s 
Magic 8-Ball beliefs could be said to be justified for the reliabilist, and someone like Goldman 
might not take issue with this example. The aim here, however, is to produce an objection that is 
compelling both for the internalist and the externalist. 
 It might be more likely for the reliabilist to agree that Susie is unjustified and remain 
consistent with an externalist account of justification. This example bears similarity to BonJour’s 
famous 1980 Norman case, which he uses to draw attention to major issues with externalism. Let’s 
10




consider Goldman’s response to the following case: 
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant 
 with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any 
 kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the 
 thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New 
 York City, though he has no evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is 
 true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely 
 reliable.21 
This example leverages our intuition that Norman is unjustified because he lacks good reasons for 
his beliefs. He simply believes that the President is in New York City. While it is the case that 
Norman’s belief is the result of a reliable belief-forming process, he is unaware of the reliability 
of his clairvoyant power and ignorant of the fact that he possesses it at all. As Ted Poston puts it, 
“where the subject lacks any internally accessible reason for thinking the belief is true it seems 
irrational for the subject to maintain that belief. Rationality requires good reasons.”22 Unlike Susie, 
who has credence in her Magic 8-Ball because it produces generally true beliefs, Norman has no 
reason at all to hold the beliefs he does and thus appears unjustified. 
 The reliabilist move here is to dismiss the relativity of reliability in possible worlds. This 
is Goldman’s move in his 1993 response to the Norman case. Goldman argues that, while one 
could perhaps say that a reliabilist would hold Norman to be justified, this is because his 
clairvoyance is a reliable belief-forming process in that one possible world. He writes, “to the 
philosopher, it seems both natural and inevitable to take hypothetical cases seriously, and if 
necessary to restrict one’s conclusions about them to specified ‘possible worlds.’”23 Yet 
justification, for Goldman, pertains to what is actually reliable. While clairvoyance might be 
reliable in the possible world BonJour imagines, this ability is not objectively likely to yield true 
 
21 BonJour, Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, 62. 
22 Poston, Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. 
23 Goldman, Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology, 280. 
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beliefs. Goldman, therefore, asks, “[w]hat is the relevant domain for judging the reliability of a 
process?”24 His answer is that, because clairvoyance is generally unreliable, the reliabilist does not 
have to hold Norman’s belief to be justified. The reliabilist could give a similar response to the 
Susie example. Objectively speaking, a Magic 8-Ball does not yield generally true beliefs, and this 
is what matters for the objective truth-conduciveness of a belief-forming mechanism. The idea that 
one could imagine a possible world in which Magic 8-Balls or clairvoyance are reliable does not 
therefore hold much weight. So, we must see if there is another way the reliabilist succumbs to a 
good-reasons objection. 
VI: A Good-Reasons Account of Defeat 
 The Magic 8-Ball example can be modified in an effort to persuade the reliabilist. Let us 
say that Susie still bases her beliefs on what the Magic 8-Ball tells her, trusting that it will generally 
not lead her astray. Let us say, further, that another person, Tim, feels compassion for Susie’s 
condition and the objective unlikelihood that she will be able to acquire true beliefs. Because of 
this, Tim makes a concerted effort to actualize Susie’s Magic 8-Ball beliefs. He makes every effort 
to organize the actual state of affairs in such a way as to render Susie’s beliefs true. If Susie forms 
the belief that her home team will win tomorrow’s game, Tim, through some means, makes it 
happen. Thus, Susie trusts that her Magic 8-Ball gives her true beliefs and so endorses it as her 
belief-forming mechanism, when, unbeknownst to her, Tim is the factor ensuring her beliefs 
correspond to an actual state of affairs.25 
 
24 Ibid., 280. 
25 It has been brought to my attention that thought-experiments which depict scenarios that are highly unlikely to 
obtain in the real world may not be useful for argumentation. Important points may be made both in favour of and 
against thought-experiments which depict absurd situations, but engaging with this debate is not within the scope of 
this paper. This paper will treat thought-experiments as a method of helping the reader to focus on important issues 
within a theory. Extreme, even unlikely, scenarios allow us to see more clearly issues within a theory that are less 
12




 It seems safe to assume that both an internalist and externalist would hold Susie’s belief-
forming process here to be non-justification-conferring; it is not the Magic 8-Ball that leads her to 
true beliefs. Yet, despite the absurdity of the situation, Susie’s trust in the Magic 8-Ball as a reliable 
belief-forming mechanism does seem justified. Despite her condition, the sheer force of the 
evidence supporting that conclusion could allow her to form the belief that the Magic 8-Ball is 
reliable. After all, it is not impossible for Susie to form any beliefs whatsoever; rather, it is simply 
increasingly difficult, so she opts not to form her everyday beliefs on her own. Susie has good 
reason to think that the Magic 8-Ball reliably produces true beliefs, since, from her perspective, 
each of the beliefs she adopts through its use turns out to be true. The truth of the beliefs gained 
through the Magic 8-Ball serves to justify the belief that the toy is a reliable belief-forming 
mechanism. Yet it is Tim that makes the beliefs true after Susie has formed them, so knowledge 
of Tim’s involvement would serve as evidence to the contrary, but Susie does not have this 
knowledge. Justification is determined by one’s current epistemic situation, and knowledge of 
Tim’s involvement is not a part of Susie’s. Her current evidence justifies the belief that the Magic 
8-Ball is a reliable belief-forming mechanism. 
This could be perceived as a contradiction to the first point in this section – namely, that 
her beliefs formed on the basis of the Magic 8-Ball are intuitively unjustified. Here we must draw 
a distinction between the Magic 8-Ball beliefs themselves and the belief that the Magic 8-Ball 
allows for a reliable belief-forming process. What this paper suggests is that the latter is justified, 
 
clear in more normal cases; they set up an argument in an engaging way. For instance, trolley problems, while far-
fetched, must be taken seriously in ethics. However, some retain serious concerns about the admissibility of unlikely 
thought-experiments into argumentation. But we can also imagine a similar case to Susie’s that would certainly obtain 
in the real world: a child thinks his Christmas wishlist is a reliable belief-forming mechanism. He forms the belief that 
he will receive a bike this year because what he writes on the list materializes. We know it is the boy’s parents who 
ensure a bike is under the tree on Christmas day, but the boy believes it is the list that causes his gifts to appear, and 
therefore causes true beliefs about his gifts. 
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while the former are not. Susie’s credence in the Magic 8-Ball is appropriate because she has good 
reason for it – the beliefs it produces always miraculously turn out to be true! For Susie, this fact 
is what causes her to accept the beliefs the Magic 8-Ball gives her. Yet we can see that, from an 
objective standpoint, her Magic 8-Ball beliefs are ultimately unjustified due to Tim’s involvement. 
Susie’s beliefs do not accurately conform to an actual state of affairs, as she sees it, but rather the 
world is forced to conform to her beliefs. So, her belief-forming mechanism is not reliable in the 
way she thinks it is, and therefore her beliefs, too, are not justified. We can assert this position 
while also maintaining that Susie, due to her lack of knowledge of Tim’s role, is justified in 
thinking the Magic 8-Ball yields reliably true beliefs. 
 What if Susie was to become aware of Tim’s project? Any rational person would agree that 
her previously justified belief that the Magic 8-Ball was a reliable belief-forming mechanism is 
defeated. This paper will argue that, by invoking the concept of epistemic defeat, we can show 
how reliabilists must appeal to a good-reasons evaluation of justification. The defeasibility of a 
belief refers to its ability to lose positive epistemic status. S’s belief in P may at one point be 
justified and lose its justification later on. A defeater is what causes a belief to lose its justificatory 
status. The standard reliabilist account of defeat comes from Goldman. It can be stated thus: “The 
Alternative Reliable Process Account of Defeat (ARP): S’s belief that P is defeated at t if there’s 
some reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S at t which, if it had been used by S in 
addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S’s not believing that p.”26  
As Emilia Miller points out, ARP is capable of resolving intuitive cases of defeat, but has 
many exceptions, signaling that this account of defeat is insufficient. She writes that the reliabilist 
 
26 Miller, Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat, 84. See also Goldman, What Is Justified Belief?, 102. 
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is committed to the following claim: “Psychological Realism: An account of defeat is 
psychologically realistic if it does not place implausible or unfulfillable cognitive demands on 
epistemic agents.”27 One can conceive of cases that illustrate the ineffectiveness of the reliabilist 
account of defeat. One such case is the most recent articulation of the Magic 8-Ball example in 
this paper. While knowledge of Tim’s involvement arguably defeats the belief in the reliability of 
the Magic 8-Ball, ARP cannot account for such a defeater. This is because it is not psychologically 
realistic for Susie to use another reliable belief-forming mechanism, due to her condition. So, the 
reliabilist must either reject one of the hallmarks of their view or the account of defeat is 
insufficient. Because it is unlikely that the reliabilist would give up the former, they must be able 
to appeal to a different account of defeat. 
 A reasons account of defeat – in which a belief’s defeasibility is triggered when there are 
reasons to assent to its negation – seems to be a good alternative. Knowledge of Tim’s involvement 
undercuts Susie’s belief in the reliability of the Magic 8-Ball and gives her reason to reject her 
prior belief. Once she becomes aware of Tim’s involvement, she ought to abandon the belief that 
the Magic 8-Ball is a reliable belief-forming mechanism. Susie’s belief in the reliability of her 
Magic 8-Ball is defeated because she no longer has good reason to believe it. Here, good reasons 
could be construed as evidence, since she no longer has evidence to support her belief. Also note 
that, if ARP would work in the Susie example, it would also be due to an implicit acceptance of a 
good-reasons analysis. The presence of another reliable belief-forming mechanism that would 
have yielded a different result seems to involve the notion of good reason. Susie ought to reject 
her prior belief because she no longer has good reason, due to the presence of another reliable 
 
27 Ibid., 83. 
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belief-forming mechanism that would have yielded an opposing belief as its product. 
 This account of defeat, however, does not square well with the reliabilist’s commitment to 
reductivism, or the necessity of involving non-epistemic terms. Evidence is an epistemic term, and 
a good-reasons analysis of the justification of a belief invokes it. Thus, the reliabilist is placed in 
an odd position. It is easy to conceive of cases where ARP fails due to one of reliabilism’s central 
commitments, and the obvious alternative does not demonstrate compatibility with reductivism. 
Since any reasonable epistemic theory must account for defeasibility, we must either reject 
reliabilism in its current articulation – i.e. as committed to both reductivism and psychological 
realism – or rearticulate the theory in order to accommodate good reasons in epistemic evaluation. 
Justification in this case would not be purely external. 
VII: Conclusion 
Many criticisms have been raised against either side of the debate between internalism and 
externalism about justification. The aim of this paper was to highlight a worry that has not been 
the focus of much attention in the literature thus far and should perhaps be paid greater attention. 
It has argued against the externalist theory of justification by showing how both its core 
commitments and most significant articulation allow beliefs formed for the wrong reasons to be 
justified. First, this paper explained the general externalist position, then showed how externalism, 
when expressed broadly, must hold that beliefs that seem to be unjustified are, in fact, justified. A 
significant line of response was then addressed: that more clearly defined articulations of the 
externalist thesis can avoid this objection. This paper considered the most popular externalist 
articulation, reliabilism, and the possible response that, in the ‘Thievery’ example, Hasty does not 
satisfy the appropriate causal requirements for belief-formation and is thus unjustified. The 
16




objection was then reformulated using the Magic 8-Ball example. While it is not clear that 
reliabilism allows beliefs based on bad reasons to be justified, it must account for an agent’s having 
good reasons as a factor in epistemic justification – an internalist consideration. Because of this, 
even a clearly defined externalist theory of justification like reliabilism falls apart when it is 
committed to being wholly external. The obvious rejoinder from the externalist to the initial 














28 This is not to say the case has been made against all externalist theories of justification. More work must be done 
to examine other more specific articulations of the externalist thesis like the ones clarified in an earlier footnote. 
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